Do Threats Galvanize Authoritarians or Mobilize Non-Authoritarians? Experimental Tests from 19 European Societies

Online Appendix

Table A1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Minimum	Maximum	Mean/Med./Mode	Missing
Opposition to immigration	allow many	allow none	allow some	1158
Immigrant origin manipulation	0	1	.50	5
Immigrant skill manipulation	0	1	.50	5
Authoritarianism	-4.32	4.03	.00	1911
Dominance values	-3.10	5.37	.00	1596
Born in country	0	1	.90	11
Speaks official language	0	1	.95	0
Not religious	0	1	.46	267
Subjective income	1	4	3.08	331
Employment status	unemployed	employed	employed	123
Education	less than secondary	higher	secondary	0
Age	15-29	60+	45-59	75
Urban	0	1	.64	87
Female	0	1	.53	22

Table A2. Multilevel Models of Opposition to Immigration Using Pooled Sample

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Immigrant origin	.226 (.042)***	.229 (.042)***	.205 (.035)***
Authoritarian values	.145 (.010)***	.105 (.014)***	.117 (.015)***
Immigrant origin × authoritarian		.080 (.018)***	.079 (.016)***
Immigrant skill	.762 (.044)***	.775 (.012)***	
Dominance values	.190 (.007)***	.188 (.007)***	
Speaks official language	.137 (.033)***	.141 (.033)***	
Not religious	.014 (.014)	.014 (.014)	
Born in country	.116 (.024)***	.119 (.024)***	
Perceived income	−.114 (.009)***	−.113 (.009)***	
Not in labor force	−.068 (.016)***	−.067 (.016)***	
Unemployed	.031 (.029)	.033 (.029)	
Less than secondary education	.454 (.020)***	.454 (.020)***	
Secondary education	.366 (.016)***	.363 (.016)***	
Age: 30-44	.103 (.020)***	.101 (.020)***	
Age: 45-59	.139 (.020)***	.138 (.020)***	
Age: 60+	.226 (.020)***	.223 (.020)***	
Urban	−.086 (.013)***	−.085 (.013)***	
Female	.066 (.013)***	.065 (.013)***	
1st threshold	−.436 (.078)***	−.423 (.082)***	−.979 (.075)***
2nd threshold	.854 (.078)***	.865 (.082)***	.178 (.075)*
3rd threshold	1.882 (.079)***	1.889 (.082)***	1.099 (.075)***
N observations	32507	32507	33589
N countries	19	19	19
AIC	76535	76686	85133
Variance: country intercepts	.071	.083	.105
Variance: origin slopes	.030	.031	
Variance: skill slopes	.034		.034
Variance: authorit. slopes	.001	.002	.003
Variance: origin × authoritar.		.003	.002

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$. Multilevel ordered probit estimates with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A3. Placebo Tests: Multilevel Models of Opposition to Immigration

|	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Immigrant origin	.229 (.012)***	.234 (.043)***	.169 (.076)*
Authoritarian values	.153 (.015)***	.144 (.007)***	.140 (.007)***
Immigrant skill	.754 (.046)***	.777 (.012)***	.791 (.013)***
Immigrant skill × authoritarian val.	−.013 (.017)		
Dominance values	.189 (.007)***	.183 (.013)***	.180 (.007)***
Immigrant origin × dominance val.		.018 (.018)	
Left-right ideology			.045 (.006)***
Immigrant origin × ideology			.011 (.010)
Speaks official language	.138 (.033)***	.138 (.033)***	.110 (.035)**
Not religious	.014 (.014)	.011 (.014)	.031 (.014)*
Born in country	.112 (.024)***	.120 (.024)***	.082 (.025)**
Perceived income	−.115 (.009)***	−.111 (.009)***	−.123 (.009)***
Not in labor force	−.069 (.016)***	−.066 (.016)***	−.050 (.017)**
Unemployed	.033 (.029)	.035 (.029)	.054 (.031)
Less than secondary education	.454 (.020)***	.455 (.020)***	.454 (.021)***
Secondary education	.367 (.016)***	.362 (.016)***	.367 (.017)***
Age: 30-44	.103 (.020)***	.103 (.020)***	.113 (.021)***
Age: 45-59	.137 (.020)***	.139 (.020)***	.158 (.021)***
Age: 60+	.224 (.020)***	.224 (.020)***	.226 (.021)***
Urban	−.087 (.013)***	−.086 (.013)***	−.077 (.014)***
Female	.065 (.013)***	.065 (.013)***	.073 (.013)***
1st threshold	−.443 (.075)***	−.415 (.081)***	−.261 (.095)**
2nd threshold	.843 (.075)***	.871 (.081)***	1.050 (.095)***
3rd threshold	1.867 (.076)***	1.895 (.082)***	2.085 (.095)***
N observations	32507	32507	29452
N countries	19	19	19
AIC	76686	76709	68861
Variance: country intercepts	.063	.080	.111
Variance: origin slopes		.033	.086
Variance: skill slopes	.037		
Variance: dominance slopes		.002	
Variance: ideology slopes			.000
Variance: origin × dominance		.003	
Variance: skill × authorit.	.003		
Variance: origin × ideology			.001

$^{***}p < .001$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{*}p < .05$. Multilevel ordered probit estimates with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4. Randomization tests

	Born in country	Age	Urban resident	Female	Not religious	Higher education	Authoritarian values
AT	−0.02	0.25	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.04*	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.85)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
BE	0.03	−1.34	−0.01	−0.01	0.03	0.01	−0.08
	(0.02)	(0.90)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
CH	−0.01	−1.12	0.01	0.03	−0.01	−0.02	−0.06
	(0.02)	(0.96)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
CZ	0.00	−0.51	0.00	0.05*	−0.03	0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.73)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)
DE	−0.01	−0.22	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.00	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.67)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
DK	0.01	0.11	0.02	−0.01	−0.02	0.04	−0.06
	(0.01)	(0.98)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)
EE	0.02	−2.19*	0.00	0.02	−0.02	−0.01	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.84)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
ES	0.00	−0.15	0.00	−0.04	0.02	0.01	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.85)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
FI	0.01	0.37	0.01	−0.01	−0.02	−0.01	0.07
	(0.01)	(0.84)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
FR	0.01	1.17	0.04	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.81)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
GB	0.01	0.83	0.03	−0.02	−0.03	0.00	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.77)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
HU	0.00	−0.34	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.02	−0.02
	(0.01)	(0.89)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
IE	−0.01	0.78	−0.02	0.00	−0.02	−0.04*	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.73)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
LT	0.00	−1.47	0.00	−0.01	0.01	−0.01	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.77)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
NL	0.01	−0.34	−0.01	0.04	−0.03	0.00	−0.02
	(0.01)	(0.84)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
NO	0.00	−0.51	−0.03	0.00	0.06*	−0.04	−0.15*
	(0.02)	(0.99)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
PL	0.00	−0.03	0.04	0.05	−0.01	0.01	0.06
	(0.00)	(0.94)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.05)
SE	0.02	−1.11	0.00	0.01	−0.06*	0.01	−0.03
	(0.02)	(0.94)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
SI	0.01	1.37	0.01	−0.04	0.01	0.02	0.06
	(0.02)	(1.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)

$^{*}p < .05$. Cell entries are linear model coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Models run within country using dependent variable listed in column headers and the non-European immigrant origin treatment as independent variable. Seven (5%) of the coefficients are significantly different to zero, which is consistent with random variation and indicates effective randomization in the 19 immigrant origin experiments.

Figure A1. Response Distributions of Dependent Variable by Immigrant Origin Treatment Groups

Barplots show the proportion of respondents in the pooled sample who selected each of the four response categories for the experimental dependent variable. Dark grey bars indicate respondents exposed to the European immigrant treatment while lighter grey bars indicate respondents exposed to the non-European immigrant, i.e., cultural threat, treatment. Proportions are weighted by design weights.