

Effective Government and Evaluations of Democracy

Online Supplementary Materials

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
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Table S1. Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Support for democracy	0.00	0.28	-1.29	0.99
Satisfaction with democracy	0.00	0.36	-1.35	1.46
Electoral democracy	0.00	0.17	-1.33	0.94
Rule of law	0.00	0.18	-1.45	1.40
Log GDP per capita	0.00	0.23	-0.71	0.69
GDP growth rate	0.00	0.05	-0.73	0.23
Inflation rate	0.00	0.71	-3.56	4.80
Healthcare access and quality index	0.00	0.19	-0.64	0.50
Log rate of interpersonal violence	0.00	0.20	-0.74	0.91
Corruption index	0.00	0.14	-0.51	0.53

These descriptive statistics are based on the country-demeaned transformations of each variable used for the within-country estimates reported in the paper and use the sample of 91 countries which is employed in the main paper.

Figure S1. Regimes Types by Country and Year



Dark blue: liberal democracy; light blue: electoral democracy; peach: electoral autocracy; red: closed autocracy; white: missing values for one or more variables.

Table S2. Tests of Number of Lags and Serial Correlation

	Models of support		
	<i>N</i> Lags		
	0	1	2
DF	100	101	102
AIC test of number of lags	-4347.6	-7324.4	-7789.0
Wooldridge test of serial correlation, <i>p</i> -value	.000	.000	.914

	Models of satisfaction		
	<i>N</i> Lags		
	0	1	2
DF	100	101	102
AIC test of number of lags	-3631.4	-6428.6	-6894.4
Wooldridge test of serial correlation, <i>p</i> -value	.000	.000	.415

Table S3. SEMs using full sample of 99 states

	Model S4.1		Model S4.2	
	Dependent variable:		Dependent variable:	
	Support	Satisfaction	Support	Satisfaction
Satisfaction with democracy	.036*		.038*	
	(.007)		(.007)	
Support for democracy		.022*		.023*
		(.011)		(.011)
GDP growth per capita t_{-1}	.023	.160*	.004	.233*
	(.047)	(.062)	(.051)	(.064)
Inflation rate t_{-1}	-.000	.003	.003	.006
	(.003)	(.004)	(.003)	(.005)
Health access and quality index t_{-1}			.011	.033
			(.029)	(.039)
Log rate of interpersonal violence t_{-1}			-.033	-.078*
			(.020)	(.024)
Corruption index t_{-1}			.027	-.063*
			(.015)	(.020)
1st lag of dependent variable	1.363*	1.381*	1.346*	1.361*
	(.031)	(.028)	(.033)	(.028)
2nd lag of dependent variable	-.485*	-.501*	-.479*	-.491*
	(.028)	(.026)	(.029)	(.026)
Electoral democracy t_{-1}	.042*	.024	.051*	.000
	(.021)	(.020)	(.023)	(.020)
Rule of law t_{-1}	-.057*	-.040*	-.078*	-.031
	(.021)	(.019)	(.023)	(.022)
Log GDP per capita t_{-1}	-.015	.007	-.024	-.054*
	(.010)	(.013)	(.019)	(.026)
Residual standard deviation	.008	.014	.008	.013
<i>N</i> observations		1768		1678
<i>N</i> countries		99		99

* $p < .05$. Within-country coefficient estimates from structural equation models with robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are demeaned to remove between-country variance.

Table S4. SEMs using more stringent sample of 80 democracies

	Model S4.1		Model S4.2	
	Dependent variable:		Dependent variable:	
	Support	Satisfaction	Support	Satisfaction
Satisfaction	.035*		.035*	
	(.007)		(.007)	
Support		.032*		.034*
		(.011)		(.012)
GDP growth per capita t_{-1}	-.031	.197*	-.016	.239*
	(.055)	(.083)	(.058)	(.083)
Inflation rate t_{-1}	.000	.007	.003	.009
	(.003)	(.005)	(.003)	(.006)
Health access and quality index t_{-1}			.000	.028
			(.021)	(.039)
Log rate of interpersonal violence t_{-1}			-.055*	-.062*
			(.021)	(.027)
Corruption index t_{-1}			.029	-.081*
			(.017)	(.022)
1st lag of dependent variable	1.383*	1.388*	1.362*	1.368*
	(.034)	(.028)	(.035)	(.028)
2nd lag of dependent variable	-.503*	-.522*	-.493*	-.514*
	(.030)	(.026)	(.031)	(.026)
Electoral democracy t_{-1}	.023	.024	.032	.012
	(.026)	(.023)	(.028)	(.024)
Rule of law t_{-1}	-.034	-.042	-.060*	-.029
	(.027)	(.022)	(.030)	(.025)
GDP per capita t_{-1}	-.022	.016	-.036	-.043
	(.011)	(.015)	(.021)	(.028)
Residual standard deviation	.007	.014	.007	.013
<i>N</i> observations		1526		1457
<i>N</i> countries		80		80

* $p < .05$. Within-country coefficient estimates from structural equation models with robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are demeaned to remove between-country variance.

Table S5. SEMs including unemployment and infant mortality

	Dependent variable:	
	Support	Satisfaction
Satisfaction	.039*	
	(.007)	
Support		.025*
		(.012)
Electoral democracy t_{-1}	.045	.006
	(.024)	(.021)
Rule of law t_{-1}	-.076*	-.034
	(.024)	(.023)
GDP per capita t_{-1}	-.010	-.061*
	(.022)	(.029)
GDP growth per capita t_{-1}	.006	.268*
	(.053)	(.064)
Inflation rate t_{-1}	.004	.007
	(.003)	(.005)
Health access and quality index t_{-1}	.010	.034
	(.029)	(.039)
Log rate of interpersonal violence t_{-1}	-.033	-.077*
	(.020)	(.025)
Corruption index t_{-1}	.030	-.066*
	(.015)	(.020)
Infant mortality rate t_{-1}	.006	-.002
	(.009)	(.011)
Unemployment rate t_{-1}	.131	-.048
	(.107)	(.165)
1st lag of dependent variable	1.348*	1.356*
	(.033)	(.029)
2nd lag of dependent variable	-.483*	-.488*
	(.030)	(.027)
Residual standard deviation	.008	.014
<i>N</i> observations		1620
<i>N</i> countries		91

* $p < .05$. Within-country coefficient estimates from structural equation models with robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are demeaned to remove between-country variance. The indicator of unemployment is the “modelled estimate” from the International Labour Organisation. Infant mortality estimates are extracted from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.

Table S6. SEMs including political violence and regime transitions

	Dependent variable:	
	Support	Satisfaction
Satisfaction	.036*	
	(.007)	
Support		.022
		(.011)
Electoral democracy t_{-1}	.046*	-.007
	(.022)	(.020)
Rule of law t_{-1}	-.088*	-.047
	(.029)	(.026)
GDP per capita t_{-1}	-.026	-.056*
	(.020)	(.026)
GDP growth per capita t_{-1}	.003	.251*
	(.052)	(.063)
Inflation rate t_{-1}	.003	.007
	(.003)	(.005)
Health access and quality index t_{-1}	.007	.026
	(.029)	(.039)
Log rate of interpersonal violence t_{-1}	-.034	-.081*
	(.020)	(.026)
Corruption index t_{-1}	.027	-.065*
	(.015)	(.020)
Political violence t_{-1}	.071	-.108
	(.066)	(.066)
Regime transitions t_{-1}	-.015	-.012
	(.019)	(.016)
1st lag of dependent variable	1.347*	1.358*
	(.033)	(.028)
2nd lag of dependent variable	-.481*	-.490*
	(.029)	(.026)
Residual standard deviation	.008	.014
<i>N</i> observations		1650
<i>N</i> countries		91

* $p < .05$. Within-country coefficient estimates from structural equation models with robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are demeaned to remove between-country variance. Political violence is measured using V-Dem's "Physical violence index," which includes political killings and torture. Regime transitions are changes between democracy and autocracy, in either direction, measured using V-Dem's "Regimes of the world" indicator.

Table S7. Separate fixed effects models of democratic evaluations

	Dependent variable:	
	Support	Satisfaction
GDP growth rate $t-1$.050 (.054)	.254* (.065)
Inflation rate $t-1$.005 (.003)	.007 (.005)
Healthcare access & quality index $t-1$.003 (.029)	.024 (.039)
Log rate of interpersonal violence $t-1$	-.044* (.020)	-.083* (.024)
Corruption index $t-1$.005 (.015)	-.060* (.020)
1st lag of dependent variable	1.373* (.033)	1.368* (.029)
2nd lag of dependent variable	-.496* (.030)	-.494* (.027)
Electoral democracy $t-1$.052* (.023)	.002 (.020)
Rule of law $t-1$	-.084* (.024)	-.041 (.022)
Log GDP per capita $t-1$	-.016 (.020)	-.050 (.026)
Residual standard deviation	.090	.117
Adjusted R^2	.895	.893
N observations	1650	1650
N countries	91	91

* $p < .05$. Within-country coefficient estimates from fixed effects models with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table S8. Fixed effects models of support for democracy, satisfaction with democracy and executive approval

	Dependent variable:		
	Democratic support		
Democratic satisfaction	.262*		.359*
	(.018)		(.027)
Executive approval		.073*	-.014
		(.012)	(.012)
Adjusted R^2	.054	-.004	.165
N observations	1951	1017	1006
N countries	99	45	45

* $p < .05$. Fixed effects, within-country associations between various national opinion measures of political support. Executive approval data is the smoothed executive approval measure from the Executive Approval Project dataset, version 2.0. Robust standard errors in parentheses.