

# Does Democracy Require Public Support?

## Online Supplementary Materials

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
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## 1. The Measurement of Democracy

Although much of the appeal of the V-Dem measure over other measures is in its more finely-grained and systematic approach to measurement, even a simple comparison of these measures' distributions favors V-Dem. Figure A1 compares the V-Dem liberal democracy scale with the combined and reversed Freedom House and the combined Polity IV scales, all for 2015. As the histograms at the top of the figure make clear, both Freedom House and Polity show clustering at the top of their respective scales: both are unable to discriminate between countries with very high and merely moderately high levels of democratic rights and institutions. The V-Dem measure, in contrast, does not suffer from this problem.

The scatterplots in the lower part of Figure A1 then show that the Polity measure, in particular, has a nonlinear relationship with V-Dem liberal democracy. This demonstrates that although Polity provides fairly fine-grained measures of autocracy, it fails to distinguish between countries that are fairly democratic – i.e., most of the world (see also Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton 2010). These data are especially inappropriate for our tests, because the hypothesis has generally been that support helps democracy to survive when some level of democracy already exists, which is exactly the kind of regime that is poorly measured by Polity. Although Freedom House appears better suited for our task, the plot shows that this measure is ordinal rather than truly continuous. Moreover, Freedom House's cruder methods of scoring and aggregating sub-scales are sufficient to lead us to favor the V-Dem measure.

Figure A1. Comparing Three Measures of Democracy



Top row: histograms of three measures of democracy showing the clustering of countries at the upper ends of the Polity and Freedom House scales. Bottom row: scatterplots, with Lowess lines in red, of V-Dem liberal democracy versus Polity and Freedom House scales, showing the non-linear relationships, especially in the latter case.

## 2. The Measurement of Support for Democracy

### 2.1. Included Survey Items

#### Three statements items

1. Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one, for someone like me, it does not matter what kind of government we have (Pew Global Attitudes).
2. Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one, for someone like me, it does not matter what kind of government we have (AfroBarometer).
3. Which of the following statements do you agree with most? Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. In certain situations, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one. To people like me it doesn't matter whether we have a democratic government or a non-democratic government (LatinoBarometer).
4. Which of the following statements do you agree with most? Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. In certain situations, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one. To people like me it doesn't matter whether we have a democratic government or a non-democratic government (European Social Survey).
5. With which of the following phrases are you in most agreement: For people like me, it doesn't matter whether a regime is democratic or non-democratic, democracy is preferable to any other type of government, under some circumstances an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one (Latin American Public Opinion Project).
6. Which of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion? For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democracy, under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable, democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government (AsianBarometer)

#### Churchill items

7. Democracy may have its problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree? (World Values Survey)
8. Democracy may have its problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree? (ArabBarometer)
9. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements: Democracy may have problems but it is the best system of government (LatinoBarometer)

10. With which of the following phrases do you most agree: in general, despite its problems, democracy is the best form of government, there are other forms of government that can be just as good or even better than democracy, don't know (Latin American Public Opinion Project)
11. Please tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statement: Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems)

### **Strong leader items**

12. Best to get rid of Parliament and elections and have a strong leader who can quickly decide everything. What do you think? (New Democracies Barometer)
13. Best to get rid of Parliament and elections and have a strong leader who can quickly decide everything. What do you think? (AsianBarometer)
14. On some occasions, democracy doesn't work. When that happens there are people that say we need a strong leader who doesn't have to be elected through voting. Others say that even if things don't function, democracy is always the best. What do you think? (Latin American Public Opinion Project)
15. There are people who say that we need a strong leader that does not have to be elected. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think? (Latin American Public Opinion Project)
16. There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives? Elections and Parliament are abolished so that the president can decide everything. (AfroBarometer)
17. I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections (World Values Survey)
18. Some feel that we should rely on a democratic form of government to solve our country's problems. Others feel that we should rely on a leader with a strong hand to solve our country's problems. Which comes closer to your opinion? (Pew Global Attitudes)
19. I will describe different political systems to you, and I want to ask you about your opinion of each one of them with regard to the countrys governance for each one would you say it is very good, good, bad, or very bad? (ArabBarometer)
20. I will describe different political systems to you, and I want to ask you about your opinion of each one of them with regard to the countrys governance for each one would you say it is very good, good, bad, or very bad? (ArabBarometer)

21. I'm going to describe various types of political systems. Please indicate for each system whether you think it would be very good, fairly good or bad for this country. Governance by a powerful leader without the restriction of parliament or elections (AsiaBarometer)

### **Military rule items**

22. The army should govern the country. What do you think? (New Democracies Barometer)
23. The army should govern the country. What do you think? (AsianBarometer)
24. There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives? The army comes in to govern the country (AfroBarometer)
25. I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having the army rule (World Values Survey)
26. I'm going to describe various types of political systems. Please indicate for each system whether you think it would be very good, fairly good or bad for this country – Military government (AsiaBarometer)

### **One party rule items**

27. There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives? Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office (AsianBarometer)
28. There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives? Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office (AfroBarometer)

### **Evaluate democracy items**

29. I will describe different political systems to you, and I want to ask you about your opinion of each one of them with regard to the country's governance – for each one would you say it is very good, good, bad, or very bad? A democratic political system (public freedoms, guarantees equality in political and civil rights, alternation of power, and accountability and transparency of the executive authority). (ArabBarometer)
30. I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system (World Values Survey)

31. I'm going to describe various types of political systems. Please indicate for each system whether you think it would be very good, fairly good or bad for this country – A democratic political system (AsiaBarometer)

### **Democracy suitable items**

32. Here is a similar scale of 1 to 10 measuring the extent to which people think democracy is suitable for our country. If 1 means that democracy is completely unsuitable for [name of country] today and 10 means that it is completely suitable, where would you place our country today? (AsianBarometer)
33. Suppose there was a scale from 0-10 measuring the extent to which democracy is suitable for your country, with 0 meaning that democracy is absolutely inappropriate for your country and 10 meaning that democracy is completely appropriate for your country. To what extent do you think democracy is appropriate for your country? (ArabBarometer)

### **Importance to you items**

34. How important is it to you to live in a country where honest elections are held regularly with a choice of at least two political parties? Is it very important, somewhat important, not too important or not important at all? (Pew Global Attitudes)
35. How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose? (World Values Survey)
36. How important for you to live in democratically governed country? (European Social Survey)

### **Desire for democracy items**

37. To what extent do you want our country to be democratic now? (AsianBarometer)

## **2.2. Excluded Survey Items**

Survey responses from the following items-year-country combinations from the World Values Survey were not included in the analysis due to evidence of, or suspicion of, poor translations and severe bias (Kurzman 2014):

- Vietnam: Army rule 2001; Strong leader 2001
- Albania: Army rule 1998
- Indonesia: Army rule 2001 & 2006
- Iran: Army rule 2000; Strong leader 2000 & 2005
- India: Strong leader, all years.
- Pakistan: Army rule 1996 & 2001; Strong leader 1996 & 2001

- Kyrgyzstan: Strong leader 2003 & 2011
- Romania: Strong leader 1998, 2005 & 2012
- Egypt: Strong leader 2012

### 2.3. Latent Variable Model

We develop a dynamic Bayesian latent trait model for measuring public opinion when the observed aggregate data are fragmented across space, time, and measurement approach. We apply the model to our dataset of support for democracy marginals, thus estimating a smooth country-year panel of democratic support. Finally we validate our estimates using tests of external and construct validation. Here, we summarize our modeling approach and results.

A number of existing papers have proposed methods of measuring smooth within-country time-series of opinion (e.g Beck 1989; Voeten and Brewer 2006). We extend these methods to time-series cross-sectional data by treating country-year democratic support as an unobserved, latent trait. The observed number of survey respondents who offer support for democracy in each relevant question are modeled as Beta-Binomially distributed realizations of this latent variance (McGann 2014). Item effects adjust for the idiosyncrasies induced by survey item. Moreover, because our survey items are typically fielded multiple times in a given country, we are also able to adjust for the varying effects of items within countries (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2004). This allows us to address the problem of heterogenous item functioning across countries, which is unfortunately quite prevalent in cross-national public opinion (Stegmueller 2011). Finally, we smooth the latent estimates over time by modeling these as a random walk over time (Caughey and Warshaw 2015; Voeten and Brewer 2006).

The model is as follows. The observed number of respondents  $y$  supporting of democracy for each country  $i$ , year  $t$ , and survey item  $k$  is modeled as a binomial distributed count:

$$y_{ikt} \sim \text{Binomial}(s_{ikt}, \pi_{ikt}).$$

We then follow McGann (2014) in utilizing a beta prior on the probability parameter  $\pi$ . This allows for some additional dispersion in the observed survey responses beyond that induced by sampling.

$$\pi_{ikt} \sim \text{Beta}(\alpha_{ikt}, \beta_{ikt})$$

The two shape parameters of the beta distribution can be reparameterized to an expectation parameter  $\eta$  and a dispersion parameter  $\phi$ :

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha_{ikt} &= \phi \eta_{ikt} \\ \beta_{ikt} &= \phi (1 - \eta_{ikt}) \end{aligned}$$

The expectation parameter is then modeled as a function of the latent country-year estimates



$\theta$ , item effects  $\lambda$ , and item-country effects  $\delta$ :

$$\begin{aligned}\eta_{ikt} &= \text{logit}^{-1}(\lambda_k + \delta_{ik} + \theta_{it}) \\ \lambda_k &\sim \text{N}(\mu_\lambda, \sigma_\lambda^2) \\ \delta_{ik} &\sim \text{N}(0, \sigma_\delta^2)\end{aligned}$$

Finally, we allow our latent opinion estimates to evolve smoothly over time using a simple local-level dynamic linear model, where the current level of latent opinion is a function of the previous year’s level plus some random noise:

$$\theta_{it} \sim \text{N}(\theta_{i,t-1}, \sigma_\theta^2)$$

The estimated variances are given weakly-informative half-Cauchy priors, e.g.,  $\sigma_\lambda \sim \text{C}^+(0, 2)$  (and similarly for  $\sigma_\delta$ ,  $\sigma_\gamma$ , and  $\sigma_\theta$ ). The expectation of the item intercepts  $\mu_\lambda$  (for models 1, 2, 4, and 5) is given a  $\text{N}(1, 2)$  prior while the dispersion parameter  $\phi$  (for the beta-binomial models), is given a  $\Gamma(4, 0.1)$  prior. Finally, for all models, the initial value of latent opinion for each country  $\theta_{i1}$  receives a  $\text{N}(0, 1)$  prior. Finally, we identified the model by fixing the first item intercept  $\lambda_1$  at a value of 1.

The model is estimated using Bayesian Markov-Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods via Stan software, which implements Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampling (Carpenter et al. 2017; Stan Development Team 2017). Four parallel chains were run for 1,000 samples each, with the first 500 samples in each chain used for warm up, and discarded, and the remaining 2,000 samples of the posterior density saved and analyzed further. This number of iterations proved to be more than sufficient for convergence, with the  $\hat{R}$  diagnostic reaching a value of between 0.95 and 1.05 for all parameters.

## 2.4. Validation of Latent Estimates

To validate our model, we conduct an external validation test. This tests a model using data that were not also used to fit the model (?). To do so, we randomly split our dataset of national opinions into an 75% training set and a 25% test set. We fit our models using the training set, and use the resulting parameter estimates to predict the national proportions offering a supportive (i.e. pro-democratic) response for each of the 744 survey items comprising the test dataset.

To test the accuracy of our model, we calculate the mean absolute error (MAE) to measure the average discrepancy between the observed proportions of respondents offering a pro-democratic attitude  $y_{ikt}/s_{ikt}$ , and the simulated proportions  $\tilde{y}_{ikt}/s_{ikt}$ :

$$\text{MAE} = \frac{1}{J} \sum_{j \in ikt} \left| \frac{y_{ikt}}{s_{ikt}} - \frac{\tilde{y}_{ikt}}{s_{ikt}} \right| \quad (1)$$

We also examine the accuracy of our model’s uncertainty estimates by calculating their credible interval coverage (CIC). To do so, we find the percentage of the  $J = 744$  observed survey proportions that are included in the 80% credible interval of the corresponding

simulated survey proportions ( $\tilde{y}_j/s_j$ ):

$$\text{CIC} = \frac{100}{J} \sum_{j=1}^J \left[ \frac{y_j}{s_j} \in \text{CI}_{80} \left( \frac{\tilde{y}_j}{s_j} \right) \right] \quad (2)$$

To provide a baseline comparison for our validation tests, we also fit Caughey and Warshaw’s (2015) DGIRT model to our training set and used it to predict responses on the test set.<sup>1</sup> We furthermore include three naïve methods of estimating the out-of sample proportions: first, we use the country mean proportions, from the training dataset, to predict the proportions in the test set. Second, we use the item mean proportions; finally, we use only the grand mean response proportion across the entire training dataset.

The results of this external validation test are displayed in Table A1. Focusing first on the MAE results, we see that our proposed model offers a 45% improvement in accuracy when compared with the baseline, country mean estimates. In addition, our model performs better in predicting out of sample survey responses than Caughey and Warshaw’s (2015) DGIRT model.

**Table A1.** External Validation Tests

Model	Mean Absolute Error (MAE)	% Improvement in MAE	80 % Credible Interval Coverage
Bayesian dynamic latent opinion model	.061	44.9	60.3
DGIRT (Caughey and Warshaw 2015)	.088	20.0	17.5
Country means	.110		
Item means	.094	15.3	
Grand mean	.125	−13.2	

External validation creates two separate datasets: models are fit to the 75% training set and validated using the 25% test (or hold-out) set. Percent improvement in MAE is a comparison between model MAE and country-mean MAE. The DGIRT model is proposed by Caughey and Warshaw (2015) and implemented in the dgo R package.

We turn to the tests of credible interval coverage. These measure the accuracy of the estimates of uncertainty produced by each model. A model with accurate uncertainty estimates should have similar empirical and nominal levels of credible interval coverage. Since we use 80% credible intervals, we expect 80% empirical coverage. Coverage substantially below this nominal level shows overly optimistic standard errors; coverage substantially above this level indicates overly conservative standard errors.<sup>2</sup>

Our results show that uncertainty estimates generated by our model are somewhat too optimistic; in other words, the standard errors are too small. The 61% empirical credible

<sup>1</sup>We used the dgirt() function provided in the dgo package for R, which is created by Caughey and Warshaw and allows analysts to run the DGIRT model without having to delve into Stan.

<sup>2</sup>For example, an estimated interval between negative and positive infinity would show 100% coverage but would otherwise be completely uninformative.

interval coverage is some way from the 80% theoretical coverage. It is, however, substantially better than the coverage obtained from the DGIRT model, which leads to uncertainty estimates that are far too optimistic. In any case, there are many sources of error in cross-national public opinion data (e.g., Weisberg 2005), and we have explicitly modeled only a few. Moreover, some sources of error – such as the translation problems in the World Values Survey identified by Kurzman (2014) – are impossible to model.

### 3. Additional Tables and Figures

**Table A2.** The Effects of Democratic Support on the Emergence and Survival of Democracy, Support Estimates Not Trimmed

	Change in democracy		Upturns in democracy	Downturns in democracy
	(A2.1)	(A2.2)	(A2.3)	(A2.4)
Intercept	.323 (.541)	.591 (.574)	1.211* (.535)	.932** (.345)
Democratic support	.242** (.082)		.131 (.080)	-.192*** (.052)
Democratic support, democracies only		.382*** (.101)		
Democratic support, autocracies only		-.005 (.143)		
First lag of democracy	.164*** (.017)	.163*** (.017)	.091*** (.014)	-.053*** (.009)
Second lag of democracy	-.195*** (.017)	-.196*** (.017)	-.128*** (.013)	.062*** (.009)
Log GDP per capita	.105 (.072)	.082 (.076)	.097 (.071)	-.067 (.046)
Regional average democracy	.012* (.005)	.013* (.005)	.016** (.005)	-.002 (.003)
Change in regional democracy	.086* (.042)	.084* (.042)	.079* (.033)	-.010 (.023)
GDP per capita growth	-.019* (.008)	-.020** (.008)	-.037*** (.006)	-.017*** (.004)
Proportion Muslim	-.193 (.229)	-.336 (.244)	-.449 (.242)	-.012 (.154)
Dependence on fuel income	-.724** (.240)	-.768** (.251)	-.784** (.248)	.065 (.158)
AIC	15750.430	15749.223	14293.394	11891.854
N	3107	3107	3107	3107
N countries	130	130	130	130
Country variance	.131	.182	.347	.124
Residual variance	9.008	8.962	5.490	2.543

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . Multilevel linear models with standard errors in parentheses. Democracy is measured using the V-Dem Liberal Democracy index and is scaled from 0 to 100.

**Table A3.** The Effects of Democratic Support on the Emergence and Survival of Democracy, Controlling for Inequality

	Change in democracy		Upturns in democracy	Downturns in democracy
	(A3.1)	(A3.2)	(A3.3)	(A3.4)
Intercept	-.476 (1.048)	-.497 (1.059)	1.335 (.801)	1.799* (.768)
Democratic support	.231* (.101)		.051 (.077)	-.217** (.076)
Democratic support, democracies only		.374** (.124)		
Democratic support, autocracies only		-.013 (.164)		
First lag of democracy	.244*** (.026)	.244*** (.026)	.126*** (.019)	-.101*** (.016)
Second lag of democracy	-.267*** (.026)	-.267*** (.026)	-.150*** (.019)	.108*** (.015)
Log GDP per capita	.079 (.107)	.070 (.108)	.065 (.082)	-.033 (.077)
Regional average democracy	.012 (.006)	.011 (.006)	.007 (.005)	-.008 (.005)
Change in regional democracy	-.084 (.065)	-.085 (.065)	-.056 (.048)	.019 (.039)
GDP per capita growth	.010 (.014)	.012 (.014)	-.020* (.010)	-.027** (.008)
Proportion Muslim	.046 (.321)	-.023 (.328)	-.308 (.248)	-.319 (.251)
Dependence on fuel income	-.929** (.316)	-.987** (.321)	-.807*** (.244)	.192 (.248)
Inequality	.012 (.010)	.015 (.010)	-.005 (.008)	-.018* (.008)
AIC	7904.187	7903.876	6951.706	6287.354
N	1610	1610	1610	1610
N countries	110	110	110	110
Country variance	.085	.105	.076	.203
Residual variance	7.536	7.508	4.132	2.642

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . Multilevel linear models with standard errors in parentheses. Democracy is measured using the V-Dem Liberal Democracy index and is scaled from 0 to 100.

**Table A4.** The Effects of Democratic Support on the Emergence and Survival of Democracy, Controlling for Ethnic Fractionalization

	Change in democracy		Upturns in democracy	Downturns in democracy
	(A4.1)	(A4.2)	(A4.3)	(A4.4)
Intercept	.116 (.788)	.140 (.793)	.705 (.617)	.310 (.593)
Democratic support	.215* (.086)		.084 (.068)	-.179** (.066)
Democratic support, democracies only		.314** (.108)		
Democratic support, autocracies only		.046 (.143)		
First lag of democracy	.245*** (.023)	.245*** (.023)	.134*** (.017)	-.091*** (.014)
Second lag of democracy	-.268*** (.023)	-.268*** (.023)	-.156*** (.016)	.099*** (.014)
Log GDP per capita	.070 (.091)	.066 (.092)	.092 (.071)	.026 (.068)
Regional average democracy	.009 (.005)	.008 (.005)	.007 (.004)	-.007 (.004)
Change in regional democracy	-.062 (.058)	-.064 (.058)	-.028 (.042)	.026 (.036)
GDP per capita growth	.008 (.013)	.009 (.013)	-.021* (.009)	-.027*** (.008)
Proportion Muslim	-.004 (.256)	-.086 (.263)	-.239 (.205)	-.182 (.204)
Dependence on fuel income	-.728** (.259)	-.764** (.262)	-.789*** (.207)	-.011 (.204)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization	.091 (.316)	.177 (.324)	.356 (.253)	.360 (.252)
AIC	9717.768	9719.133	8435.228	7874.206
N	1977	1977	1977	1977
N countries	117	117	117	117
Country variance	.037	.046	.085	.148
Residual variance	7.699	7.687	3.959	2.927

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . Multilevel linear models with standard errors in parentheses. Democracy is measured using the V-Dem Liberal Democracy index and is scaled from 0 to 100.

**Table A5.** The Effects of Democratic Support on the Emergence and Survival of Democracy, OLS-PCSE Models

	Change in democracy		Upturns in democracy	Downturns in democracy
	(A5.1)	(A5.2)	(A5.3)	(A5.4)
Intercept	.326 (.849)	.357 (.874)	1.275* (.549)	.950* (.450)
Democratic support	.214* (.087)		.060 (.063)	-.155** (.047)
Democratic support, democracies only		.229* (.099)		
Democratic support, autocracies only		.171 (.168)		
First lag of democracy	.263*** (.062)	.264*** (.063)	.157*** (.045)	-.106*** (.030)
Second lag of democracy	-.285*** (.062)	-.285*** (.062)	-.177*** (.045)	.108*** (.029)
Log GDP per capita	.049 (.110)	.046 (.112)	.036 (.075)	-.014 (.062)
Regional average democracy	.009 (.005)	.008 (.005)	.006 (.004)	-.003 (.002)
Change in regional democracy	-.076 (.064)	-.077 (.064)	-.054 (.048)	.022 (.040)
GDP per capita growth	.007 (.014)	.007 (.014)	-.022* (.009)	-.029** (.011)
Proportion Muslim	-.070 (.212)	-.085 (.224)	-.247 (.179)	-.178 (.139)
Dependence on fuel income	-.663* (.278)	-.666* (.277)	-.687*** (.141)	-.024 (.188)
R <sup>2</sup>	.091	.091	.083	.043
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.087	.087	.079	.038
N	2023	2023	2023	2023
RMSE	2.798	2.798	2.035	1.748

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . Linear models with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Democracy is measured using the V-Dem Liberal Democracy index and is scaled from 0 to 100.

**Table A6.** The Effects of Democratic Support on the Emergence and Survival of Democracy, Freedom House Measure

	Change in democracy		Upturns in democracy	Downturns in democracy
	(A6.1)	(A6.2)	(A6.3)	(A6.4)
Intercept	.409 (1.077)	.247 (1.081)	5.018*** (.884)	4.013*** (.795)
Democratic support	.393** (.142)		.331** (.118)	-.186 (.106)
Democratic support, democracies only		.300 (.173)		
Democratic support, autocracies only		.550* (.236)		
First lag of democracy	-.042 (.023)	-.043 (.024)	-.057*** (.016)	.006 (.016)
Second lag of democracy	.014 (.024)	.015 (.024)	.022 (.016)	.002 (.016)
Log GDP per capita	.161 (.137)	.177 (.138)	-.195 (.113)	-.373*** (.101)
Regional average democracy	.005 (.008)	.006 (.008)	.006 (.007)	-.005 (.006)
Change in regional democracy	.053 (.056)	.055 (.056)	.086* (.038)	.038 (.038)
GDP per capita growth	.031 (.021)	.030 (.021)	-.028 (.014)	-.056*** (.014)
Proportion Muslim	-.541 (.441)	-.465 (.443)	-.540 (.378)	.296 (.332)
Dependence on fuel income	-1.568*** (.424)	-1.548*** (.420)	-1.039** (.362)	.705* (.319)
AIC	11369.882	11371.783	9902.501	9853.478
N	1920	1920	1920	1920
N countries	122	122	122	122
Country variance	.034	.005	.435	.193
Residual variance	21.206	21.236	9.538	9.442

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . Multilevel linear models with standard errors in parentheses. Democracy is measured using the combined Freedom House indices and is rescaled to range from 0 to 100. All variables are lagged one year, unless otherwise indicated.



**Table A7.** Western Vs. Other-Country Effects of Democratic Support

	Change in democracy		Upturns in democracy	Downturns in democracy
	(A7.1)	(A7.2)	(A7.3)	(A7.4)
Intercept	.579 (.715)	.366 (.703)	1.108* (.564)	.222 (.535)
Democratic support	.231* (.103)		.146 (.081)	-.134 (.077)
Support × West	-.212 (.244)		-.193 (.195)	.075 (.188)
Support, democracies only		.248* (.126)		
Support, autocracies only		.130 (.157)		
Support, democracies × West		-.230 (.256)		
Region: West	.394 (.316)	.370 (.317)	-.015 (.254)	-.581* (.248)
First lag of democracy	.258*** (.023)	.254*** (.022)	.147*** (.016)	-.092*** (.014)
Second lag of democracy	-.282*** (.022)	-.278*** (.022)	-.170*** (.016)	.100*** (.014)
Log GDP per capita	.031 (.088)	.048 (.087)	.061 (.069)	.038 (.065)
Regional average democracy	.008 (.006)	.009 (.006)	.009* (.005)	-.003 (.004)
Change in regional democracy	-.075 (.056)	-.075 (.056)	-.050 (.041)	.018 (.035)
GDP per capita growth	.008 (.012)	.011 (.012)	-.023* (.009)	-.029*** (.008)
Proportion Muslim	-.099 (.254)	-.155 (.253)	-.243 (.205)	-.061 (.201)
Dependence on fuel income	-.656* (.257)	-.703** (.257)	-.722*** (.206)	-.022 (.201)
AIC	9969.864	10174.768	8684.230	8053.018
N	2023	2062	2023	2023
N countries	120	130	120	120
Country variance	.034	.038	.086	.145
Residual variance	7.797	7.838	4.062	2.919

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . Multilevel linear models with standard errors in parentheses. Democracy is measured using the V-Dem Liberal Democracy index and is scaled from 0 to 100.

**Table A8.** Western & Latin American Vs. Other-Country Effects of Democratic Support

	Change in democracy		Upturns in democracy	Downturns in democracy
	(A8.1)	(A8.2)	(A8.3)	(A8.4)
Intercept	.299 (.679)	.142 (.664)	1.134* (.539)	.552 (.513)
Democratic support	.251* (.113)		.134 (.091)	-.144 (.087)
Support × West/LatAm	-.075 (.172)		-.086 (.139)	-.072 (.134)
Support, democracies only		.245 (.141)		
Support, autocracies only		.188 (.165)		
Support, democracies × West/LatAm		-.046 (.196)		
Support, autocracies × West/LatAm		-.644 (.552)		
Region: West & Lat.Am.	.031 (.167)	.044 (.166)	-.135 (.139)	-.217 (.139)
First lag of democracy	.260*** (.023)	.256*** (.022)	.148*** (.016)	-.092*** (.014)
Second lag of democracy	-.283*** (.022)	-.279*** (.022)	-.170*** (.016)	.100*** (.014)
Log GDP per capita	.053 (.086)	.068 (.084)	.061 (.068)	.013 (.064)
Regional average democracy	.009 (.005)	.009 (.005)	.009* (.004)	-.004 (.004)
Change in regional democracy	-.075 (.056)	-.076 (.056)	-.050 (.041)	.017 (.035)
GDP per capita growth	.007 (.012)	.011 (.012)	-.023* (.009)	-.029*** (.008)
Proportion Muslim	-.054 (.254)	-.121 (.250)	-.285 (.206)	-.150 (.203)
Dependence on fuel income	-.655* (.256)	-.652* (.257)	-.712*** (.207)	.005 (.202)
AIC	9972.731	10177.558	8685.999	8058.471
N	2023	2062	2023	2023
N countries	120	130	120	120
Country variance	.022	.014	.083	.146
Residual variance	7.814	7.863	4.065	2.924

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . Multilevel linear models with standard errors in parentheses. Democracy is measured using the V-Dem Liberal Democracy index and is scaled from 0 to 100.

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